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This  paper  studies  agents  who  consider  the  experiences  of  their 
neighbors  in deciding  which of two technologies  to use. We analyze 
two  learning  environments,  one  in  which  the  same  technology  is 
optimal  for all players and another  in which each technology  is bet- 
ter  for  some  of  them.  In  both  environments,  players  use  exoge- 
nously  specified  rules  of  thumb  that ignore  historical data but may 
incorporate  a tendency  to use the more popular technology.  In some 
cases  these  naive  rules  can  lead  to  fairly  efficient  decisions  in  the 
long  run,  but  adjustment  can be  slow when  a superior  technology 
is first introduced. 
I.  Introduction 
This  paper  presents  two simple  models  of  how economic  agents  de- 
cide which  of  two technologies  to use when  the  relative  profitability 
of  the  technologies  is unknown.  In  both  models,  agents  base  their 
decisions,  at least in part, on  the experience  of  their neighbors;  this 
is what we mean by "social learning." We believe that social learning is 
frequently  an important  aspect of the process of technology  adoption, 
where "technology" should  be broadly construed:  Although  our main 
examples  concern  the adoption  of agricultural technology,  we believe 
that the  models  may also be applicable  to the diffusion  of new  man- 
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agement  practices  and  to  parents'  decisions  whether  to  send  their 
children  to a public or a private school.' 
The  learning  environments  we  study  have  three  main  features: 
First, agents  observe  both  their  neighbors'  choices  and  the  payoffs 
that  these  choices  generate.  Second,  agents  periodically  reevaluate 
their  decisions,  as  opposed  to  making  a  once-and-for-all  choice. 
Third,  we  consider  the  possibility  that  players  may  be  sufficiently 
heterogeneous  that under  full  information  they would  not  all make 
the same choice. 
Instead  of  assuming  that the  adoption  process  is described  by the 
equilibrium  of  a game  played  by  fully  rational  agents,  we  suppose 
that  players  use  exogenously  specified,  and  quite  simple,  "rules of 
thumb." We have several reasons for proceeding  in this fashion.  First, 
in  some  of  the  environments  we  consider,  fully  Bayesian  learning 
requires  calculations  that  may be  too  complicated  to be  realistic.  A 
second  motivation  for  our  approach  is  that,  to  the  extent  that  the 
technology  choice  may be substantially different  from  previous  deci- 
sions  the  players  have  faced,  we  would  be  uncomfortable  with  the 
assumption  that the  technology  adoption  process  is described  by an 
equilibrium.  A somewhat  different  motivation  is simply technical ex- 
pediency:  we did not see an easy way to incorporate  various consider- 
ations we feel  are important  into a rational-actor equilibrium  model. 
The  paper  is  structured  around  two  simple  models  of  learning 
environments.  The  first  model  has  a  homogeneous  population  of 
players choosing  between  two competing  technologies,  with the pay- 
off to each technology  subject to an aggregate  independent  and iden- 
tically distributed  (i.i.d.)  shock.  Each  period,  only  some  fraction  of 
the  players  have  the  opportunity  to  revise  their  choices;  the  other 
players continue  using  whichever  technology  they used  in the previ- 
ous period. 
Our  analysis  begins  with  a particularly  "naive" rule  of  thumb  in 
which players ignore  all historical data and simply choose  whichever 
technology  worked  better  in the  previous  period.  This  rule will lead 
the popularity  of  the two technologies  to fluctuate  unless  one  of  the 
technologies  has a higher  payoff  for all values of the shock. We subse- 
quently consider  rules that incorporate  "popularity weighting," a ten- 
dency  to choose  a more  popular  technology  even  if it was somewhat 
less profitable last period.  We find that the appropriate  use of popu- 
larity weighting  leads players to adopt  and stick with the better tech- 
1 See Rogers and Shoemaker  (1971)  for an extensive  discussion of empirical research 
on  adoption  processes,  especially  in  development.  Mansfield  (1968)  and  Ryan  and 
Gross (1943)  are classic studies  of technology  adoption  in basic industries  and in agri- 
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nology,  provided  that the technology  with the higher  mean  payoff  is 
also the  more  likely to have  the  higher  payoff  ex  post.  Intuitively,  a 
strategy that is more  popular  today is likely to have done  well in the 
past, so that the  relative  popularity  of  the  technologies  can serve as 
a proxy  for  their  historical  performance.  Thus  it is fairly clear that 
popularity  weighting  rules can lead  to better  decisions.  We find that 
one  particular choice  of  popularity  weights  picks out the better tech- 
nology  in  the  long  run,  regardless  of  the  initial  state of  the  system 
or the  size of  the  payoff  difference;  however,  this gain  in long-run 
efficiency  may have the cost of slowing  the adoption  of technological 
improvements. 
Our second  model  has a heterogeneous  population,  with each tech- 
nology  better  for  some  of  the players. Thus  the question  here  is not 
whether  the  better  technology  will be  adopted,  but  rather  whether 
the new technology  will be adopted  by the appropriate  players.2 We 
suppose  that  there  is a continuum  of  players  distributed  uniformly 
over  a line  and  that nearby  players  have  similar payoffs  to the  two 
technologies.  Moreover,  we suppose  that players base their decisions 
on the relative performance  of the two technologies  at locations  that 
are  within  one  "window  width"  of  their  own.  This  window  width, 
which  is exogenous  in  our  model,  can  be  thought  of  either  as the 
result of  an informational  constraint-players  may not observe  out- 
comes  at  faraway  locations-or  as  the  result  of  the  players'  prior 
belief that faraway locations are sufficiently different  that experiences 
there  are not relevant  to their own decisions. 
Once  again,  players  revise  their  technology  choices  using  simple 
rules of  thumb.  In  particular,  we suppose  that players do  not  know 
exactly how location  influences  relative payoffs  and thus simply com- 
pare the average  payoffs  of the two technologies  in their window,  as 
opposed  to using  more  sophisticated  statistical methods. 
The  heterogeneous  population  model  provides  a number  of  pre- 
dictions about the types and magnitudes  of the errors that are likely 
to be made.  The  spatial nature  of  the process  allows some  degree  of 
social learning  even  without  popularity  weighting,  and the long-run 
state of the system is approximately  efficient  when  the window width 
is small.  However,  small window  widths  imply  that  the  system  con- 
verges  more  slowly, which can be costly if the initial state is far from 
the optimum.  Roughly  speaking,  increasing  the popularity weighting 
in the spatial model  has about the same effect  as decreasing  the win- 
dow  width,  improving  long-run  performance  while  slowing  conver- 
2 Note  that  when  the  players  are heterogeneous,  a central  planner  would  need  to 
know the  relative  payoffs  of  the  competing  technologies  for every  player in order  to 
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gence.  In contrast to the homogeneous-population  model,  no amount 
of popularity weighting  will lead to an exactly efficient long-run  state. 
The  assumptions  of  our  models  are  perhaps  most  descriptive  of 
the  diffusion  of  agricultural  technologies.  We  would  expect  that 
farmers  are  able  to  observe,  at  least  roughly,  the  output  of  their 
neighbors  as well as their neighbors'  choices of crops and techniques. 
Further,  farmers'  payoffs  are  subject to aggregate  stochastic  shocks 
due  to the weather.  Concerning  inertia, it has been  frequently  noted 
that farmers  as a group  seem  very hesitant  to try new  technologies. 
These  comments  do not suggest  that all farmers are equally hesitant; 
for  example,  Slicher  von  Bath  (1963,  p.  243)  notes  that during  the 
English  agricultural  revolution,  "land tilled  in very ancient  ways lay 
next  to  fields  in which  crop  rotations  were  followed."  Even  during 
the twentieth  century,  there  is typically a substantial lag between  the 
date farmers first learn of the existence  of a technology  and the date 
they adopt it: Ryan and Gross (1943)  found  that farmers in two rural 
communities  on average  adopted  hybrid seed corn 7 years after they 
first heard  of the innovation,  with adoption  spread over a 5-10-year 
period;  studies cited in Rogers  and Shoemaker  (1971,  p.  129) report 
lags of 2-4  years for the adoption  of weed spray in Iowa and fertilizer 
in Pakistan.3 Finally, when  capital and insurance  markets are poorly 
developed,  it seems  plausible  that farmers'  technology  decisions  will 
be determined  primarily by short-term considerations,  and that farm- 
ers  will be  unlikely  to  experiment  with  a  technology  with  a lower 
expected  return. 
As for the assumptions  of the heterogeneous  model,  it seems plau- 
sible that  the  payoffs  to  various  crops  may differ  at different  loca- 
tions,  depending  on  the  soil, climate,  and  terrain of  each  farm, and 
that when a new technology  is first introduced  there may be consider- 
able  uncertainty  about  where  it should  be  used.  Consequently,  the 
fact  that  the  technology  did  well  in  one  area  or  country  may  not 
provide  much  reason  to adopt  it in another.4 
These  various  features  seem  particularly clear in the  diffusion  of 
the agricultural  practices  known  as the "new husbandry" during  the 
English agricultural  revolution.  (The  new husbandry  refers to a vari- 
3 Note  that the  spread  of  literacy and  modern  communication  media  will speed  up 
the rate at which  farmers  become  aware of a new technology's  existence,  but they do 
not  seem  to  have  eliminated  the  lag  between  becoming  informed  and  deciding  to 
adopt. 
4 Centrally based agricultural  reformers  are often  hampered  by their lack of under- 
standing of the variation in farmers' tastes and production  costs. For example,  Apodaca 
(1952)  describes  how a planner  tried  to induce  a New  Mexico  community  to adopt  a 
hybrid  corn.  The  innovation  was  adopted  and  then  discontinued  despite  doubling 
yields since the villagers decided  that the taste and consistency  of the corn were inap- 
propriate  for making  tortillas. 616  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
ety of new crops and new crop rotations that arrived in England from 
Flanders  in  the  seventeenth  century,  based  on  the  idea  of  growing 
crops  such  as clover  or  turnips  instead  of  leaving  the  land  fallow; 
see,  e.g.,  Kerridge  [1967],  Timmer  [1969],  and  Mingay  [1977].)  In 
particular,  the  new  husbandry  was attempted  and  then  abandoned 
at a number  of  locations,  which  shows  both  that  the  returns  to the 
technology  varied with location and that the form of this dependence 
was not known. 
The  spatial structure  of  the  heterogeneous-population  model  can 
be taken  literally when  the  model  is applied  to agricultural  innova- 
tions. We believe  that the model  can also be applied  to other settings, 
such as the diffusion  of  management  practices in large industries  or 
the  choice  of  private  schools;  the  location  variable  should  be  inter- 
preted  as a point  in characteristic space, and individuals  with similar 
characteristics believe  that their payoffs  are similar. 
Turning  from  the  assumptions  of  the  models  to  the  conclusions, 
we  note  that  the  homogeneous-population  model  predicts  that  the 
speed  with which a new technology  is adopted  is correlated  with the 
extent of the payoff  difference.  Such a correlation between the extent 
of  improvement  and  the  speed  of  adoption  has  been  noted  in  the 
empirical discussions of Mansfield (1968) and Rogers and Shoemaker 
(1971), but has not, as far as we know, been addressed  in the learning 
literature.5  The  homogeneous-population  model  also  predicts  that 
new technologies  that result in a small probability of  a big improve- 
ment  and a large probability of a small loss will be adopted  slowly, if 
at all; this is consistent  with the slow diffusion  of seat belts and vacci- 
nations noted  by Rogers and Shoemaker  (1971,  p.  139). Further, the 
fact that the combination  of inertia and popularity weighting  can lead 
to efficient  long-run  behavior in the homogeneous-population  model 
may  make  the  apparent  occurrence  of  these  phenomena  less  puz- 
zling. Likewise, in the heterogeneous-population  model,  the parame- 
ter  values  that  favor  long-run  efficiency-namely,  small  window 
widths and high popularity weights-lead  to slow diffusion.  This may 
help to explain  the observed  slow diffusion  of some agricultural tech- 
nologies.6 
There  have been several previous models of the role of social learn- 
ing in technology  adoption.  Perhaps the earliest is the contagion  pro- 
cess, which models  adoption  as a random  matching  process in which 
players switch to the new technology  the first time they meet someone 
5However,  the  correlation  is easy to explain  as the  result of  an optimal  investment 
policy under  complete  information  if adopting  the  innovation  requires  investing  in a 
capital good. 
6 The  most striking case of slow diffusion  may be that of the new husbandry,  which 
diffused  at a rate of  1 mile per year both  in England  and in France. SOCIAL  LEARNING  617 
who is using  it. This  process yields the familiar "S-shaped  curve" for 
the  time  path  of  adoption  that  has  been  widely  used  in  empirical 
work, for example  by Griliches (1957)  and Mansfield (1968). 
Recent  papers  by Banerjee  (1992,  in press), Bikhchandani,  Hirsh- 
leifer,  and Welch (1992),  and Smith (1992)  study more  sophisticated 
models of social learning  in homogeneous  populations,  in which play- 
ers must decide  which of two choices  is better. The  primary question 
of  interest  in  these  models  is  whether  social  learning  implies  that 
the  population  eventually  identifies  the better  choice.  These  papers 
suppose  that players observe  one  another's  choices,  but that players 
do  not  observe  the  payoffs  that  these  choices  generate.  Manski 
(1990)  considers  estimation  procedures  for  an individual  agent  in a 
heterogeneous  population;  he  does  not  analyze  the  resulting  social 
dynamics. 
Although  we believe that the models we develop,  based on bounded 
rationality and players' observance  of their opponents'  payoffs,  are a 
useful supplement  to this previous work on social learning, we should 
say that we are not completely  satisfied with the  precise  form  of  the 
rules we consider.  In particular, in the first model,  use of history does 
not seem  so complicated  as to be unreasonable.'  Our purpose  is not 
to argue  that any one  of  these  models  is particularly compelling,  but 
rather to identify  general  properties  that seem  to occur  in some  of 
the  more  obvious  formulations.  One  recurrent  conclusion  is that in 
a number  of cases the  long-run  state of the system is fairly efficient, 
even  though  the individual  decision  rules are quite naive. 
II.  A Simple  Model  of  Homogeneous  Populations 
Before  we consider  social learning  in systems with a heterogeneous 
population,  it is interesting  to consider  the simpler case in which the 
same technology  is optimal for all players. This model can be thought 
of  as describing  behavior  at a single  site  in  the  model  we  consider 
later on,  where  the  relative  payoffs  vary with location.  Suppose  that 
there  is a large  (continuum)  population  of  players  at a single  site, 
each of whom must choose  whether  to use technology  or technology 
g.  In each  period,  all players  using  the  same  technology  receive  the 
same payoff.9 We suppose  that the payoffs  to the two technologies  at 
date t, uf and ug, are related  by the equation 
U9-  f =  0  +  Et,(1) 
7Cross  (1983)  develops  a model  of boundedly  rational adaptive choice with a similar 
information  structure. 
8 In  the  second  model  the  environment  is complicated  enough  that  a great  many 
periods  would  be required  to obtain  good  estimates,  as we discuss in Sec. III. 
9 Given our  assumption  that players observe  one  another's  payoffs,  nothing  would 
be changed  if we allowed  each  player's payoff  to be subject to idiosyncratic shocks. 618  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
where  0 is a fixed  but  unknown  constant  parameter  and  the  Et  are 
i.i.d. shocks with zero mean  and cumulative  distribution  function  H. 
We shall assume that p  1  -  H(-0)  -  prob[ug  -  uf  0] is strictly 
between  zero and one. 
In the initial period,  denoted  zero,  a fraction x0 of  the players are 
using technology  g. After  each period,  a fraction a  of the players are 
selected  at random  to have  the opportunity  to revise their choices.'0 
We suppose  that the  players  who  are revising  their  choices  can ob- 
serve the average payoffs of both technologies  in the previous period. 
The  simplest behavior  rule we consider  is the "unweighted" rule un- 
der which all players who revise their choice  pick the technology  that 
did  best  in  the  preceding  period.  Under  this  adjustment  rule,  the 
evolution  of  the system is described  by 
{  (  1  -  a)  x  +  a  with probability p  =  prob [u  9  uf], 
t+l  =  (1 -  a)xt  with probability 1 -  p =  probig  < u],(2 
so that 
E(xt+IxIxt)=(1  -t)xt  +  o?p.  (2') 
Note  that players treat the adoption  and discontinuance  decisions 
symmetrically,  which  corresponds  to  the  case  in  which  the  costs of 
"transition" are  small.  This  symmetry  is probably  extreme,  but  we 
think that it may be preferable  to the standard  practice in modeling 
technology  diffusion,  which  supposes  that  once  agents  try the  new 
innovation  they continue  using  it forever:  Studies  of the English ag- 
ricultural  revolution,  as well  as studies  of  more  recent  innovations 
cited  in  Rogers  and  Shoemaker  (1971,  p.  115),  suggest  that  the 
amount  of  discontinuance  is  an  important  factor  in  the  diffusion 
process. 
Our model  supposes  that players do  not have access to the entire 
history of payoff  observations.  To justify this assumption,  we suppose 
that individual  players  revise  their  choices  too  infrequently  to want 
to  keep  track of  each  period's  results  and,  more  strongly,  that the 
market at this particular "location" is too small for a record-keeping 
agency  to provide  this service.  Also,  the private gain from  using  his- 
tory may be  small in  the  cases,  detailed  below,  in which  the  system 
without  history converges  to the efficient  outcome. 
The  following  result is standard; it follows from, for example,  theo- 
10 As  mentioned  in  the  Introduction,  this  inertia  is consistent  with  the  empirical 
evidence  that there is often  a substantial lag between  the time individuals first learn of 
the existence  of a new technology  and the time they adopt  it. The  inertia might come 
from  decision  costs; it would  also arise if the choice  of a technology  is embodied  in a 
costly capital good  that will not be replaced  until it wears out. SOCIAL  LEARNING  619 
rem  10  of  Norman  (1968).  (It  is  also  a  consequence  of  part  b of 
proposition  2 below.) 
PROPOSITION  1. The  system (2) is ergodic;  that is, the time average 
of x, converges  to its expectation  with respect  to its unique  invariant 
measure  pu.  Moreover,  E ,(x)  =  p, and var,(x)  =  p(I  -  p)xt1(2 -  at). 
III.  A Single  Location  with  Popularity  Weighting 
Proposition  1 says  that  observing  the  long-run  fraction  of  players 
using  technology  g  reveals  the  fraction  of  the  time  in  which  g  has 
been  the  better  choice.  If  the  distribution  H  of  E  is  symmetric  or 
nearly  so,  the  technology  that  is more  often  better  has  the  higher 
expected  payoff."  This  suggests  that if all other  players in the popu- 
lation  are  choosing  whichever  technology  has  the  highest  current 
score,  each  player  could  gain  by considering  the  relative  popularity 
of  the two technologies  as well as the  recent  payoffs.  Intuitively,  the 
current  popularity  provides  some  information  about the past history 
of  the process  and,  thus, can serve as a proxy  for it. 
Of  course,  if  all  players  consider  popularity  in  guiding  their 
choices,  the  level  of  popularity  becomes  less informative,  and in the 
extreme  case in which players consider  only popularity,  the popular- 
ity conveys no information  at all. This leads us to consider  the behav- 
ior  of  the  system  when  all players  give  popularity  an  intermediate 
weight.  As we shall see,  there  are popularity  weights  that, if used by 
all players, lead  them  all to adopt  the better technology.  One way to 
interpret  this  result  is  that  in  this  case,  even  when  popularity 
weighting  is used  by all players,  the  popularity  remains  a "sufficient 
statistic" for the history. 
To  explore  the idea  of  popularity  weighting,  we develop  a simple 
parametric model.  As above, we consider  a continuum  of players and 
suppose  that  only  a  fraction  a  of  them  update  their  choices  each 
period.  Now,  though,  instead  of  choosing  the  technology  that  did 
best last period,  the choice  rule is 
choose g if ug -  uf  m(1 -  2xt)  (3) 
Under  this  rule,  the  probability  that  those  players  who  revise  their 
choices  choose  g is prob[O +  Et  ?  m(l  -  2xt)]  =  1 -  H(m(l  -  2xt) 
-  0); when  all players  use  rule  (3), the  fraction  using  g evolves  ac- 
cording  to 
f(1  -  a)xt  +  a  with probability 1 -  H(m(l  -  2xt) -  0),  (4 
t+l  (LI -  (X)X1  with  probability  H(m(I  -  2x,)  -  0). 
" This  conclusion  holds  provided  that the degree  of  asymmetry of H is small com- 
pared to I  0 |. 620  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
The  parameter  m indexes  the amount  of popularity weighting;  the 
case  m  =  0  corresponds  to  the  unweighted  case  discussed  above. 
When  x  =  1/2,  both  technologies  are  equally  popular;  in  this  case 
players choose  the technology  with the highest  current payoff for any 
value  of  m. As m grows,  players  become  more  willing  to choose  the 
currently  popular  technology  even  if  its current  payoff  is  lower.'2 
Note  that  the  expression  1  -  2x  is unitless,  so  the  parameter  m is 
measured  in the same units as the payoffs  are. Thus  to preserve  the 
same  decision  rule  when  the  payoff  functions  are  multiplied  by  a 
constant  X, the  parameter  m must  be  multiplied  by  the  same  con- 
stant.  13 
We  use  the  linear  specification  of  popularity  weighting  primarily 
for analytic convenience.  It combines  nicely with a second simplifying 
assumption  that we  make  in  this  section,  that the  distribution  H  of 
the  shocks  per  period  et  is  uniform  on  [ -a,  a].  This  allows  us  to 
explicitly compute  the long-run  behavior  of  the system for any m. It 
also ensures  that  the  linear  class of  weighting  rules  we consider  in- 
cludes  one  rule  that leads  the asymptotic  distribution  to concentrate 
on the optimal  choice,  namely  m =  ar. 
To  analyze  the dynamics  of  the system, we first identify  situations 
in which  it is certain  to converge.  Since  the lowest  possible  value  of 
i  is  - -,  the lowest possible observation  of ug -  uf is 0 -  vr.  Hence, 
if xt is sufficiently  large  that 0  -  cr ?  m(1  -  2xt) or, equivalently,  if 
Xt 2  xg  (m -  0  +  o)/2m,  the fraction  using  technology  g is certain 
to increase. Likewise,  if x  <  V  =-(m  -  0 -  o)/2m,  the fraction using 
f  is certain to increase.  (Note  that C >  0 implies Vf <  xg.) Because  the 
probability of an upward  step is minimized  at x,  =  0, this probability 
must be at least prob[O +  E  2  m]  =  (r  -  m +  0)/2r  =  -  (m/r)  xf. 
Thus  when Vf <  0, so  that the system cannot  "lock on" to downward 
steps,  the  probability of  an upward  step is uniformly  bounded  away 
from zero.  Similarly, ifxg  >  1, the probability of a downward  step is 
uniformly  bounded  away from  zero. 
The  discussion  above  shows  that  (with  knife-edge  cases  ignored) 
there  are four  possibilities  for  the  long-run  behavior  of  the  system: 
(1)  If  xg  <  1 and  Vf <  0,  the  system  is certain  to  eventually  make 
enough  upward jumps  that xt >  xg,  so that from  any initial position 
12 The  empirical literature  suggests  that popularity weighting  is a factor, but reliable 
estimates  of  m are  hard  to come  by.  Rogers  and  Shoemaker  (1971,  p.  142)  say that 
"many students  of  peasant  life  feel" that innovations  must be 20-30  percent  better to 
be adopted;  they also cite a President's  Science Advisory  Committee  figure of 50-100 
percent.  From  our  reading,  it  is  not  clear  whether  these  premia  reflect  popularity 
weighting  or switching  costs. 
13 An alternative explanation  of the need  for resealing is to use the fact that the rule 
m =  a  yields  the  optimal  long-run  decision.  Since  u is the  standard  deviation  of  the 
payoff  differences  per period,  resealing the utility function  rescales a  in the same way. SOCIAL  LEARNING  621 
the system converges  with probability one  to x, -  1. (2) If xg >  1 and 
f >  0, the  system converges  to x,  =  0 from  any initial position.  (3) 
If 0 <  f and xg <  1, the system will converge  (with probability one) 
to zero if xo '  xf  and will converge  to one if xO  ?  xg; for xO  E  (xf, xg), 
the system will also eventually  converge  to a steady state, but it has a 
positive  probability  of  ending  up at each  of  the  two steady states of 
the system.  (4) If Vf <  0 and xg >  1, the system will not converge  to 
either  steady state. Instead,  the fraction xt will continue  to fluctuate. 
These  observations  do  most  of  the  work required  to establish the 
following  claims. 
PROPOSITION  2. 
a)  Popularity  weighting  m =  or is "optimal" in the  sense  that from 
any xO  the  system  converges  with  probability one  to the  state in 
which everyone  uses the better  technology. 
b)  m >  Cr  is "overweighting" in that the system converges  with proba- 
bility  one  to  a  steady  state;  which  steady  state  is  selected  may 
depend  on  the  initial  condition  xO. More  precisely,  the  system 
converges  to the  better  technology  if  101  '  m -  cr, whereas  for 
101  <  m  -  cr the  behavior  of  the  system  depends  on  the  initial 
condition  x0. If xO 2  (m +  cr -  0)/2m,  the  system converges  to 
one  with  probability  one;  if xO '  (m  -  cr -  0)/2m,  the  system 
converges  to zero with probability one.  If 101  <  m -  cr and xO  E 
((m -  Cr -  0)/2m,  (m +  Cr -  0)/2m),  the  system  will eventually 
converge  to one  of  the  steady  states, but both  steady states have 
a positive  probability. 
c)  With "underweighting,"  that is, m <  cr, the system need  not con- 
verge  to a steady state. It does  converge  (with probability one)  to 
the better technology if 101  '  a  -  m, but for 101  <  cr -  m, the 
system has a nondegenerate  invariant distribution  IL,  with 
1  0 
2  2(r  -m) 
and 
oa0ExE,(1 
-  x) 
var 
X 
-  (2-(x)cr-2(1-t)m 
Proof. (a) If m =  ar,  then xg  =  (2m -  0)/2m is less than one  iff 0 > 
0, and  Vf  =  -0/2m  is greater  than  zero  iff  0 <  0.  The  conclusion 
now  follows  from  the  argument  in  the  text.  (b) If  suffices  to check 
that forO  >  m -  a>  0,  xf  <  0 and xg <  1; for  -0  >  m  -  o>  09, f 
>  0 and xg >  1; and for m -  C >  01,  f>  0 and xg <  1. (c) A similar 
computation  shows that when  101  >  Cr  -  m, the system must converge. 
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bution when u7  -  m >  101 and computes  the corresponding  mean and 
variance. Q.E.D. 
COROLLARY.  For any prior distribution  over 0 with a finite expected 
value whose  support  contains  [-  a, a],  the expected  long-run  payoff 
is continuous  and increasing  in m on  the interval [0, a]. 
Proof. Increasing  m increases  the  set  of  0's for  which  the  system 
converges  to  the  better  choice  and  increases  the  "tilt" of  the  mean 
toward the better choice  for smaller  0's. Q.E.D. 
Proposition  2  shows  that  the  system  is certain  to converge  to the 
correct choice if the popularity  weight m =  or  and that the payoff loss 
from a wrong  choice  must be small if m is close to this level. Thus  it 
is interesting  to ask whether  there is any particular reason to suppose 
that popularity  weights  equal  or close  to Cr  are likely to be  used  or, 
conversely,  whether  there  are  forces  in the  model  that would  drive 
the players to use different  weights.  As a partial response,  our work- 
ing  paper  (Ellison  and  Fudenberg  1992)  considers  a game  in which 
players  simultaneously  choose  their  individual  popularity  weights, 
and it shows that the optimal  weight  m =  Cr  is its unique  equilibrium 
outcome.  This  result  is only  a partial response  because  it supposes 
more  sophistication  in  the  determination  of  the  popularity  weights 
than we find compelling.  However,  the result does show that popular- 
ity weighting  need  not conflict with individual  incentives.  We conjec- 
ture that optimal  popularity  weighting  might  emerge  from an adap- 
tive process  because  individuals  have  a private incentive  to increase 
m whenever  m <  (x. 
The  reader  may  be  concerned  that  the  results  in  proposition  2 
seem  to  rely on  the  fact  that  the  uniform  distribution  has compact 
support: an observation  that ug -  uf >  C implies that 0 >  0. However, 
similar conclusions  can be obtained without compact support. Appen- 
dix A shows that the nonlinear  rule "switch only if the observed  pay- 
off difference  is large compared  to the popularity" leads to a long-run 
distribution  that places most of  its weight on the better choice  when- 
ever the distribution of errors is "infinitely revealing in the tails." This 
nonlinear  rule has the additional  advantage  that it does  not depend 
on the exact form of the distribution of the noise, whereas the optimal 
linear rule for the uniform  distribution  must be tailored to the distri- 
bution's support.  Appendix  A also reports simulations of a more com- 
plex rule that seems to work well even when the tails are not infinitely 
revealing. 
While  our  formal  results  concern  the  eventual  steady state of  the 
system, the speed of convergence  is of some interest as well. In partic- 
ular, consider  an initial position  in which x0 is small, so that g corre- 
sponds to a "new" technology,  and suppose  that 0 >  0, so that the new SOCIAL  LEARNING  623 
technology  is in fact an improvement.  Then  the share of technology  g 
increases whenever  0 +  et  >  m(l  -  2x,); since the probability of this 
event increases with 0, so does  the expected  rate of adoption.'4 As we 
noted  in the  Introduction,  such  a correlation  between  the  extent  of 
improvement  and the speed  of adoption  has been  noted  in empirical 
work. 
Note  also that for fixed  0, the speed  of convergence  decreases  as af 
increases, so that each period's observation  becomes  less informative. 
Furthermore,  if the  new  technology  usually  does  slightly worse than 
the old one but occasionally does much better (i.e., if the new technol- 
ogy has a higher  mean  payoff  but a lower median),  then naive learn- 
ing  rules  that  look  only  at the  recent  relative  performance  will be 
biased toward the wrong  choice.  This  is consistent  with the observa- 
tion  that  seat  belts,  insurance,  and  vaccinations  have  been  slow  to 
diffuse. 
Finally,  before  leaving  the  homogeneous-population  framework, 
we would like to report simulation  results for one simple modification 
of popularity  weighting  that seems  to improve  the short-run  perfor- 
mance of the system without changing  its long-run  behavior. We now 
suppose  that  players  consider  "trends" in the  relative  popularity  of 
the two technologies  as well as the  popularity  itself. 
More  precisely,  suppose  that players  now  choose  technology  g iff 
the  realized  difference  in  payoffs  ug  -  uf  exceeds  the  expression 
m(l  -  2x,)  -  c(xt -  xt- 1), where xt -  xt- 1 is the trend in popularity. 
Since  the  trend  variable converges  to zero  along  any path in which 
the  system  converges  to  a steady  state,  the  system  still converges  to 
the  better  technology  with  probability  one  when  m  =  a.  However, 
if  the  initial  state  is  far  from  the  optimum,  as  is the  case  when  a 
superior technology  is first introduced,  one would expect that respon- 
siveness  to  trends  would  help  to increase  the  speed  with which  the 
new technology  is adopted. 
To  test this intuition,  we ran three simulations,  each with the noise 
term  e  uniformly  distributed  on  [-ar,  a]  and  popularity  weighting 
m  =  a.  In  the  first,  the  fraction  a  who  adjust  each  period  was  .5, 
and  the  mean  payoff  difference  0 was  .5u;  in  the  second,  a  =  .5 
and  0  =  .lo;  in  the  third,  a  =  .1  and  0  =  .02cr. In  all cases,  we 
counted  the number  of periods  required  for the system to move from 
initial state xO =  .05ar to x  =  .99o.  The  results,  reported  in table  1, 
show that trends  can improve  the speed  of convergence. 
14 Unless  the payoff  difference  is so extreme  that 0 -  a  >  m, in which case the rate 
of adoption  is independent  of  0. Note  that the rate is also an increasing  function  of 0 
when m =  0, provided  that 0 is smaller than a. 624  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
TABLE  1 
TREND  WEIGHTING  AND  THE  SPEED  OF  CONVERGENCE 
a  =  .5, O =  .5cr  a  =  .5, O = .cr  a  =  .1, O  =  .02cr 
C=  0  11  39  940 
c=  5  10  26  710 
C=  10  10  28  470 
NOTE.-On  the basis of  estimated  standard  errors,  the first two digits are correct at the  .95 level. 
IV.  Heterogeneous  Populations  with  Linear 
Technologies 
Now  we  turn  to  the  study  of  heterogeneous  populations,  in  which 
different  technologies  may be  optimal  for  different  individuals.  As 
before,  we  suppose  that  there  are only  two technologies,  denoted  f 
and g, with  the  mean  difference  in payoffs,  E(ug  -  uf),  equal  to 0. 
Now though,  we think of 0 as representing  a location along a line, so 
that players at different  locations have different  0's. In particular, the 
optimal  rule  (both  socially and  privately)  is for  players with positive 
0 to use g and players with negative  0 to usef,  so that the distribution 
of technology  choice  has a cutoff  or break point  at 0  =  O. 
It will be important  in what follows  that the relative advantage  of 
using technology  g at location  0 may be correlated  with the "absolute 
advantage" of location  0, for example,  the productivity of the "land." 
To capture this, we suppose  that the payoffs  to the technologies  have 
the following  linear  form: 
ug(O) =  0  +  P30  +  Elt, 
Uf(0)  =  10  +  E2t  (5) 
With  this  parameterization,  13 >  0  implies  that  technology  g  does 
better at "good" locations,  and  13  <  0 implies that g does better at bad 
ones.  The  player's location  in 0-space determines  his average  payoff 
to the two technologies.  We suppose  that players base their decisions 
on  the  average  performance  of  the  two technologies  at locations  in 
their "observation windows"; the observation  window of the player at 
0 is the interval  [0  -  w, 0  +  w]. We call w the "window width." 
As in the study of a homogeneous  population,  we begin by analyz- 
ing  the  simple  rule  in  which  players  use  whichever  technology  did 
better in their window  last period;  later we shall enrich  the model  to 
allow for popularity  weighting.  To  define  this rule formally, suppose 
that the distribution  of  players over  locations  has a constant  density, 
which we normalize  to equal  one,  and let i-g(0) be the average  score 
realized  by those  players  in the  interval  [0  -  w, 0  +  w] who  used  g SOCIAL  LEARNING  625 
at period  t, with  the  convention  that iu9(0) =  -  if every  player  in 
the interval used f; the average  -uf(0)  is defined  analogously. 
The  (unweighted)  decision  rule  for the player at 0 is then 
play g at period t +  1 iff ui(0)  -  u7 (0)  0.  (6) 
In the  previous  sections  we considered  a model  with a continuum 
of players and inertia, so that the fraction of players using each strat- 
egy can never  shrink  all the  way to zero  in finite time.  In our  study 
of spatial models,  though,  we shall suppose  that there is no inertia at 
individual  locations,  so  that  all  players  at each  location  revise  their 
choices each period.  We do so in part for reasons of convenience  and 
in  part  because  learning  seems  too  easy  when  all  players  observe 
the payoffs  to both  technologies  in every period.  Moreover,  it seems 
plausible that in rural areas with low population  density a technology 
could  be  abandoned  by everyone  in  an observation  window  after  a 
few bad draws in succession. 
We have two interpretations  in mind for this model.  First, the loca- 
tion  parameter  0 may correspond  to geographical  location,  with the 
performance  of  the  technologies  linked  to variables such  as climate 
or terrain that are in turn correlated  with location. Second, the model 
may describe  adoption  decisions  at a single village, where  players are 
differentiated  by idiosyncratic  payoff-relevant  characteristics such as 
wealth and  household  size.  We want to think  of  the  payoff-relevant 
variables as being  unobservable  but correlated  with the observed loca- 
tions.  The  idea  is that players  do  not  know  exactly  which aspects of 
their  locations  are  payoff-relevant  or  how  these  aspects  influence 
their payoffs.  This  is why we do  not allow the  players to regress  the 
observed  payoffs  of  each technology  on the corresponding  values of 
0. When  one  is studying  geographic  diffusion,  the  observation  win- 
dow might  reflect the player only observing  the outputs  of his neigh- 
bors,  and  the  window  width  w might  be  fairly  small.  When  one  is 
studying  adoption  at  a  single  site,  the  observation  window  corre- 
sponds  to  the  players'  beliefs  about  which  other  players  are  suffi- 
ciently similar for their experiences  to be relevant,  and players might 
well observe  the  actions  and  outcome  of  others  who  are outside  of 
their window.  To the extent  that the relevant characteristics are diffi- 
cult to determine,  the  window  widths in this interpretation  might  be 
fairly large.'5 
As a first step  in analyzing  the  decision  rule  (6), suppose  that the 
noise terms  Elt  and  E2t  are identically  zero, so that the system is deter- 
15 In both interpretations,  players might prefer  to weight observations of their imme- 
diate  neighbors  more  heavily  than  those  of  players  who  are  farther  away but  still 
within the observation  window; this may be particularly attractive when the observation 
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ministic.  Suppose  further  that the  current  state of  the  system  is de- 
scribed  by a cutoff rule.  That  is, suppose  that there  is a Ot such  that 
all players  with  0  2  %,  choose  g  and  all those  with  0 <  Ot choose f. 
Then  the period  t +  1 state will be described  by a cutoff  rule as well. 
To  see this, note that all players at 0 >  Ot +  w see only g being played 
and,  hence,  will play g in the  next  period;  similarly, all players at 0 
<  Ot -  W  play.  Players at every  0 E  [Ot  -  w, Ot +  w] see bothf  and 
g being  played,  with 
r0+w 
f+W  +  f sds  A 
Ut  (_)  f  t  d  _  =3(O-w  +  (7) 
2t 
Thus  for Ot -  W  <  0< 0" <  ot  +  w,we  have 
_  0"  - 0'_  a 
u9(0)-  {t(0")  =  ugt(0  )  7(of)+  2 
so that if the  player  at 0' plays g in period  t  +  1, then  so does  the 
player at 0". Hence  the  state at period  t +  1 is described  by a cutoff 
rule. 
Our  analysis  restricts  attention  to  the  evolution  of  these  cutoffs. 
Given  our  assumption  that  the  payoff  difference  between  the  two 
technologies  is monotone  in location,  cutoff  rules seem  natural; one 
might  suspect  that  even  if  the  initial  state  is not  a cutoff  rule,  the 
system  will  converge  to  one.  However,  we  have  not  attempted  to 
verify this result because  in the absence  of a cutoff  rule the system is 
much  harder  to analyze. 
A steady-state  cutoff  rule  must  have  the  property  that the  player 
at  the  steady-state  cutoff  is  indifferent  between  f  and  g  given  his 
observations.  Thus  the  steady  state is the  unique  solution  of  -u7(0*) 
=  uf(0*).  This  gives  (P  +  1)[0* +  (w12)] =  13[0* -  (w12)] and thus 
0*  -(213  +  1)w  (8) 
Note  that although  the optimal  cutoff  is 0  =  0 for any value of  1, 
the steady-state  cutoff  equals zero only if 13  =  -  1/2.  When 13  =  0, for 
example,  so that the  payoff  to f is identically  zero  and the  payoff  to 
g is equal to 0, the steady state occurs at -  w/2 (see fig. 1). The discrep- 
ancy between  the  steady  state and  the  optimum  arises from  our  as- 
sumption  that players do  not directly observe  0 and,  hence,  use only 
the average  payoffs  received  by the two technologies  in making their SOCIAL  LEARNING  627 
/  (e)  = e 
I  IS 
-w  =-3wt2  .  *  +w  wf2  f(0)=O 
FIG.  1 
decisions.  Note  that the maximum  steady-state payoff loss at any loca- 
tion is the absolute  value of 0*, which is small if ,3 is not too large (in 
absolute  value)  and the window  width w is small. 
Having  determined  the  steady-state  cutoff,  we  next  examine  the 
behavior  of  the  system away from  the steady state. It is easy to show 
that, from  an initial cutoff  00, the cutoff  will move  toward the steady 
state 0* at a distance  of  w each  period  until  it is within  w12 of  0*. 
Once  0, is  within  this  interval,  the  system  typically  enters  a  stable 
two-period  cycle about  0*. For ease of  reference,  we summarize  this 
as a proposition. 
PROPOSITION  3. From an initial cutoff  00,  the system determined  by 
(6) and  (7) evolves  according  to 
ot+W  ot<0*  2 
2'  2 
btl=  |-0t  +  20*  0tE  -  H  +'  2.),9 
wt-  to  0tA0*  +  2 
Proof. If  t7(0t -  w)  -  (  >  0, then  all players who observe 
both technologies  being  played  (i.e.,  all players in the  interval  [0t  - 
W, Ot  +  w]) use  g  in  period  t  +  1. Substituting  Ot  =  0,  -  w into 628  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
equation  (7), we see  that this is the  case if (13  +  1)0t 2  1(0  -  w) or 
Ot 2  -w  =  0*  +  (w12). Similarly, if Ot <  0*  -  (w12), all players who 
see both technologies  being  played  choose f  in period  t +  1. Finally, 
if o  E  [0*  -  (w12), 0*  +  (wI2)),Ot+1  will satisfy (I +  1)(+1  +ot  + 
w)  =  3(Ot+I  +  ot  -  w),  so  that  Ot+  =  -Ot  -  (21  +  1)w  =  -Ot  + 
20*. Q.E.D. 
Next we consider  the behavior  of the model  with noise, that is, with 
Eilt  and  E2t  nondegenerate  i.i.d.  random  variables. Let zt  =  E2t  -  Eilt 
denote  the  difference  in the  two shocks,  and  let 0  *  =  0*  +  zt;  0t  is 
the steady state of  the system when  E2T  -  El,  is identically equal to zt 
for  all  T.  Because  behavior  rule  (6) depends  only  on  the  difference 
between  the  payoffs  to f and g and  not on  their levels,  the evolution 
of  the  system  from  Ot  when  the  shock  is z, is the  same  as that given 
in equation  (9), with the term  0* replaced  everywhere  by 0*. 
PROPOSITION  4.  If the period  t cutoff  is Ot  and the period  t shock is 
Zt, the period  t +  1 cutoff  is given  by 
ot +W  ot <ot*-2 
0t+I =|-t  +2t*  tE  t  2't  2)  (I10) 
ot-W  ot-t  2 
Proof. For locations  0 E  [Ot  -  W, Ot +  W], the  difference  between 
the average payoffs  of the two technologies  in 0's observation window 
(the interval [0 -  w, 0  +  w]), that is, u0(0,  E It)  -  uf{(0,  E2t),  is 
0  +  Ot +  (2_  +  )w  0 +  ot  -  20t  -  7 
2  At  2 
Since  t >  0*  +  (w12) implies  0  +  Ot 20:  for  all 0  -  W,  ot  > 
0t*  +  (w12) implies  that  all  players  who  observe  both  technologies 
choose  g.  Similarly,  Ot  <  0*  +  (w12) implies  that all players who  see 
both  technologies  chooser.  Finally, if  t  E  [0t  -  (w12), 0*  +  (w12)), 
the period t cutoff is given by  +  1=  -  t  +  20*. Q.E.D. 
PROPOSITION  5. When the zt are i.i.d. draws from a distribution that 
has  a  strictly  positive  density  on  a  compact  support,  the  dynamic 
process  generated  by (10) has a unique  invariant distribution F, and 
the  expected  probability  distribution  at date  t converges  to F  uni- 
formly over  initial probability distributions  pt. 
Proof. Appendix  C shows  that the  system is a random  contraction 
in the sense of Norman  (1972)  and satisfies uniqueness  condition  2.11 
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TABLE  2 
STEADY-STATE  VARIANCE  FOR  UNIFORM  NOISE 
VARIANCE  OF 
w/U  System  (10)  System  (11) 
.5  .2134  .25 
.1  .0483  .05 
.05  .0246  .025 
.01  .0050  .005 
We  have  not  been  able  to  characterize  this  distribution  directly. 
Instead,  we have  computed  an invariant  distribution  of  the  simpler 
system generated  by 
A  0t  +  wV  0t  C  t 
ot+1  A  A  0* 
0t  t 
lo- 
to 
ot0t*  (.l 
Note that system ( 11) differs  from (10) only when  t falls in an interval 
of  width  w. Normally  we think  of  the  variance  of  zt as being  much 
larger  than  the  window  width;  in  this  case  it  may be  reasonable  to 
guess  that  the  invariant  distributions  of  (10)  and  (11)  are  close  to- 
gether. 
We  should  point  out  that  the  simplified  system  (11),  unlike  (10), 
does  not have a unique  invariant distribution:  Because  all steps have 
size w, from  initial position  00, the support  of  (1 1) is concentrated  on 
the grid  Oo +  kw, and  so different  initial conditions  lead to different 
invariant distributions.  Moreover,  the supports  of the date t distribu- 
tion are different  for  t even  and  for  t odd.  Despite  these  qualitative 
differences  between  systems (10) and (1 1), the absolute magnitude  of 
the  effect  of  the  initial  condition  is  small  when  w is  small,  which 
supports  the  conjecture  that  the  two  systems  are  similar.  Table  2 
provides  further  support  for  this belief  by comparing  Monte  Carlo 
estimates of the steady-state  variance of  (10) with the variance of the 
particular invariant distribution  of  (11) that is computed  in proposi- 
tion  6 below.  As conjectured,  the  two variances  are close  when  w is 
small. 
To  examine  the  invariant  distributions  of  (11),  suppose  that  the 
noise  terms  zt are i.i.d.  with  mean  zero  and  cumulative  distribution 
function H. Then  Ot follows a Markov process with the transition from 
ot to ot  +  w having  probability prob[0*  +  z  ot]  =  1  -  H(ot  -  0*). 
The  invariant distribution  has a particularly simple form when the zt 
are uniform  on  [-  ar, a]  and  the  grid  {00 ?  kw} contains  the  points 
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PROPOSITION  6.  Suppose  that  the  z, are  uniform  on  [-  cr, or] and 
that M  =  alw  is an integer.  Then  one  invariant distribution  of  (11) 
is the binomial  prob(0  =  0*  +  kw) =  [2M!I(M  -  k)!(M  +  k)!]2  2M; 
this is the limit of the time average distribution when the initial condi- 
tion belongs  to the  grid 0*  +  kw. 
Remark.  -Recall  that the mean of this distribution is 0*, its variance 
is uw/2,  and  the  distribution  is asymptotically  normal  as w tends  to 
zero. 
Proof. To  show thatf  is an invariant distribution,  it is sufficient  to 
verify  that  it  meets  the  "detailed  balance  condition"  that,  for  all 0 
and  0',  the  (unconditional)  probability  flow  from  0 to  0' equals  the 
probability flow in the reverse  direction.  Thus  we shall verify that 
f(O) prob(0+ 1 =  0'I  Ot  =  0) = f(0') prob(0t+ l =  0  l  Ot  =  0') 
or, equivalently,  that 
f(0)  prob(0+tl  =  0l0t =  0') 
f(0')  prob(0t+I =  0'  IOt=  0) 
Since  the  probability  of  a jump  of  more  than w is zero,  it suffices 
to  check  that  this  condition  holds  between  adjacent  states,  so  take 
0  =  0*  +  kw and  0'  =  0*  +  (k +  1)w for  some  integer  k between 
-Mlw  and  (M  -  1)1w. For such states, we have 
f(P)  2-2M[2M!I(M  +  k)!(M -  k)!]  M +  k +  1 
f(0')  2-2M[2M!I(M  +  k +  1)!(M -  k -  1)!]  M -  k 
and 
prob(0t+  =  =  0  O 0')  [  +  (k +  1)w]/2_  (M +  k +  1)w 
prob(0t+1 =  0' ot =  0)  (or  -  kw)12u  (M -  k)w 
so detailed  balance  holds.  Q.E.D. 
As one  would  expect,  the variance of the steady state is increasing 
in w because  small w corresponds  to small steps in each period.  Note 
that the  social optimum  is the  constant  0  =  0 and that the expected 
welfare  loss (compared  to  =  0) when  the cutoff  is 0t is 
ot  ot2  fodo 
2 
Hence,  in the long  run the average welfare loss per period  (from the 
invariant distribution  computed  in proposition  6) is 
!E(02)  =  [E(o)]2 + 
I var(0)=  [(21  +  1)2W  + SOCIAL  LEARNING  631 
so that  steady-state  welfare  is decreasing  in w. For small w, despite 
the lack of either  memory  or popularity  weighting,  the spatial nature 
of the process allows the long-run  outcome  to be approximately  effi- 
cient.  16 
While  small w's are thus  desirable  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  time 
average  payoff,  they  entail  a significant  short-run  welfare  loss when 
the  initial  state  is  far  from  the  optimum,  because  in  this  case  the 
system  will take  a long  time  to  approach  the  neighborhood  of  the 
optimum.  This  is true  for two reasons:  First, ot  is limited  to move  at 
most w per period.  Second,  in the  presence  of noise,  a typical path is 
likely to take far more  than O01w  periods  to reach a neighborhood  of 
0*, because  many steps will be taken in the wrong  direction. 
For a fixed  initial condition  and  social discount  factor, the socially 
optimal  window  width  will trade  off  the  speed  of  convergence  and 
the  steady-state  variance,  with  larger  w's being  optimal  the  farther 
the  initial  condition  is  from  zero.  If  the  social  planner  does  not 
know the initial condition  or the  location  of  the social optimum,  the 
size of the optimal  w will depend  on the  planner's  prior beliefs.  This 
trade-off  between  speed  of adjustment  and the variance of the steady 
state seems  a natural  feature  of the  sorts of  model  we consider.'7 
At this point  we would  like to make a few observations  about how 
the conclusions  might change  if the players did keep records of their 
past observations.  Since  players  at locations  within  or of  0* will play 
both technologies  infinitely  often,  they  could  eventually  learn which 
technology  is better  for  themselves  by keeping  such  records.  How- 
ever, a few calculations  suggest  that this learning  process will be fairly 
slow if the random  shock to the payoffs  has a sizable common  compo- 
nent  and w is small. 
To see this, suppose  that the payoffs  to each technology  are subject 
to a common  shock  nt as well as the idiosyncratic  shocks we assumed 
before,  so that system  (5) is replaced  by 
Ug(0)  =  0  +  10  +  Elt  +  Ott 
(5') 
U{(0)  =  10  +  E2t  +  Ott~ 
16 Although  our leading  example  of very small window widths is the English agricul- 
tural revolution,  small window  widths should  not be seen as requiring  illiterate agents. 
Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  farmers  often  distrust  the  information  of  central 
authorities and experts,  and prefer  to see how innovations  work out in their neighbor- 
hood.  As noted  earlier, Ryan and Gross (1943) found  that the experiences  of neighbors 
were  an  important  factor  in  the  adoption  of  hybrid  seed  corn  by twentieth-century 
Iowa farmers. 
17Although  we  have  not  checked  the  details,  it seems  that  a combination  of  large 
window  widths with a rule of  proximity-weighted  averages  could  combine  faster con- 
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If the variance of mt  is relatively large, then observations of only one 
technology  at date t are not very informative,  and only observations of 
both technologies  in the  same period  will be helpful.  Players at loca- 
tions far from 0* rarely see both technologies  played and hence would 
need  a very long  memory  to learn.  Players at locations  0 closer to 0* 
do  see  both  technologies  played  more  often.  For these  players  the 
systematic payoff  difference  between  the technologies  is smaller, and 
hence  it may  require  many  observations  to  be  fairly confident  that 
one  is better.  Our  informal  approximations,  reported  in  Appendix 
E,  suggest  that  this  is  indeed  the  case  and,  in  particular,  that  the 
number  of  periods  required  to be fairly confident  which technology 
is better is on the order of  (urlw)312;  when w is small, a very long 
history  would  be  required  for  players  to  do  much  better  than  with 
our  simple  rule.  Of course,  players could  use  history even  when  the 
advantage  to doing  so is slight or slow to develop,  but in these  cases 
it seems  less  obvious  that  players  would  be  led  to  abandon  simple 
rules. 
V.  Examples  of  Nonlinear  Technologies 
Before  considering  the implications  of popularity  weighting  in a het- 
erogeneous  population,  we  would  like to  discuss  some  examples  of 
what can happen  without  popularity  weighting  when  the  payoffs  as 
a function  of location  do not take the linear form  presumed  in equa- 
tion (5). Suppose,  for example,  that the "old" technologyf  has returns 
that are identically  zero,  and g(O) =  cos(O), so that regions  in which 
g is optimal  alternate  with  regions  in which f  is. If there  is no  noise 
in the  system  and  the  window  width  is relatively  small, then  even  if 
all players in locations  0 E  [- -aI2,  r/2]  adopt  the new technology  g, 
the new technology  will not spread  to the other  regions  in which it is 
optimal. In this example  there are substantial social gains from having 
the new technology  "tested" at a number  of diverse locations.  It may 
also  be  interesting  to  note  that  when  the  local  process  may  fail  to 
spread as widely  as it should,  random  shocks to payoffs  can increase 
social welfare; that is, welfare can increase as the variance of the noise 
term zt increases from  zero. Suppose  that the technologies  aref(O)  = 
o and  g(O) =  cos(0),  and  that  the  initial  state  has all players  to the 
right of  00 using g and  players to the left  using f.  Without  noise,  the 
cutoff  will  move  to  0*  -  3rrI2 and  stay  there  (see  fig.  2).  When 
the support  of zt is sufficiently  large, there  will eventually  be enough 
consecutive  draws  of  very  negative  zt  that  the  cutoff  reaches  r/2. 
From this point,  the system may no longer  have a single cutoff,  since 
players to the left of  r/2 will tend to switch to g and those to the right 
switch back to f.  Essentially,  the  noise  leads  the  players in region  II SOCIAL  LEARNING  633 
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to use the new technology  long enough  that it can spread from region 
I to region  III. 
The  next  example  shows  that in certain  extreme  cases the  specifi- 
cation  error  involved  in  ignoring  how  payoffs  vary with  "location" 
can allow a technology  that is everywhere  inferior  to completely  drive 
out  a better  one.  This  is the  case depicted  in figure  3, in which f(O) 
=  0 and  g(O)  =  0  -  E.  If  the  current  cutoff  occurs  at 0, then  the 
player at 0 E  [0-w,  0  +  w] computes  Ug(0)  =  0  -  E  +  {[0  -  - 
w)]12}, and Vf(O) =  -  w  +  {[0 -(  -  w)]/2}. Since Ug(O) -  -uf(O) 
f(B) 
O  m  ..........................  / 
18(e).. 
uf (B) I-',,,,, 
/ 1  7  ~~~  ~~Iv 
I  i  I+ 
O-w  F  I  B+w 
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=  w  -  E,  if  w>  E all  players who  observe  both  technologies  choose 
technology  g.  Hence  Ot,  =  Ot  -  W, and  eventually  g will take over 
the entire  population. 
We  should  point  out  that these  technologies  are quite  special:  an 
inferior  technology  can drive out  a better  one  only  if the difference 
in payoffs  If -  g I  is small compared  to the errors caused by estimating 
the payoffs  by their average values in the window.  These  errors have 
magnitudes  of  w(df/dO) and  w(dg/dO), which  bound  the  difference 
between  the  payoffs  at  0  -  w and  0  +  w. Thus  if  w is small,  the 
difference  in payoffs  If -  gI must be  small as well in order  for the 
inferior  technology  to dominate;  hence  even  though  the wrong tech- 
nology  is adopted  everywhere,  the  payoff  loss at each location  is not 
substantial. (In the example  above,  the payoff  loss at each location  is 
E, and  E must be less than w in order  for g to dominate.) 
For small window widths, a more substantial payoff loss arises when 
the new technology  is not adopted  in a region  in which it is a substan- 
tial improvement.  This  was  the  case  in  the  example  in  which  g  = 
cos(0)  and f  =  0, so that  the  regions  in which g should  be  adopted 
are disconnected.  We can also modify  the example  of figure  3 so that 
g is better than f at every location  (and so in particular is better on a 
connected  set) and yet a substantial  payoff  loss results from g failing 
to spread.  In figure  4, the  payoffs  to f and g are such that g is much 
better than fin  the neighborhood  of 0  =  0 but is only slightly better 
than  for extreme  0 values.  Hence,  if technology  g is first introduced 
0 
.*  Is(s) 
*  f(e) 
Ft.et+ 
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at these extreme  values, it will be driven out of the population  before 
it can be tried in the center  region. 
VI.  Heterogeneous  Populations  and Popularity 
Weighting 
Our analysis of  social learning  in homogeneous  populations  showed 
that popularity  weighting  could  improve  the aggregate  performance 
of the learning  process.  We shall now investigate  the implications  of 
popularity  weighting  in  our  model  of  a  heterogeneous  population 
with linear technologies. 
To  model  popularity  weighting,  let x,(0) be the fraction  of players 
in the interval  [0  -  w, 0  +  w] who  use technology  g. In the spirit of 
the  popularity  weighting  rule  (3), we  now  modify  the  decision  rule 
(6) used  in Sections  IV and V and suppose  that players use the deci- 
sion rule 
play g at period  t +  1 iff  iu(0)  -  u{(0) ? m[l  -  2xt(0)],  (12) 
where,  as before,  the  parameter  m indexes  the  importance  of  popu- 
larity in the  players' decisions. 
Since the analysis of this system is quite close to that of the system 
without popularity  weighting,  we shall give the results without proof. 
As in Section  IV, if the state in period  t corresponds  to a cutoff  rule, 
so will the state in period  t +  1. In addition,  without  noise terms the 
system  has  the  same,  unique,  steady-state  cutoff  0*  =  -  (2 I  + 
1)  w/2.  However,  the  introduction  of  popularity  weighting  does 
change  the dynamics  in two ways. First, in the absence of noise terms, 
the system converges  to the steady-state cutoff  from any initial cutoff; 
the oscillations  described  in proposition  3 do not arise. Second  (and 
relatedly),  movements  of  less than  one  window  width  become  more 
common  since  players  are  more  hesitant  to use  a less popular  tech- 
nology. 
The  following  proposition  gives a more  precise  description  of  the 
dynamics. 
PROPOSITION  7.  From  an initial cutoff  00,  the  system described  by 
decision  rule  (12) and  payoffs  (5) evolves  according  to 
0t+1  - 
Ot +  w  ifot  <  -  +- 
|  '  [2  +  w  H  t )]i  t E 
* 
[t-  M  +  2)  0*  +  (m  +-] 
-t -w  if Ht>t*+  (m  +2 
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Proof. The  proof  is omitted.  The  calculations  involved  are straight- 
forward  and  quite  similar  to  those  of  proposition  3.  Note  that  the 
dynamics above reduce  to those of proposition  3 when m =  0, as they 
should  do. 
To  see  that,  in  the  absence  of  noise,  the  system  converges  to  0* 
from any initial cutoff,  note that the cutoff  moves a full window width 
as long as I  0t  -  0*  1  >  m +  (w12).  Eventually,  then, I  A, -  0* I < m + 
(w12), and from  then  on  Ot+1  -  0*  =  [(2m  -  w)I(2m +  w)](kt  -  0*), 
so that the system converges  to 0* at a geometric  rate. 
Note  also that for  a given  t,  the  system will move  less than a full 
window width whenever  the realization of 0* is in an interval of width 
2m +  w. This shows that popularity weighting  makes the system more 
"sluggish" and suggests that it will reduce the variance of the long-run 
distribution.  To  verify  this  intuition  and  determine  the  extent  to 
which popularity  weighting  reduces  the variance, we characterize the 
long-run  distribution  in one  special case. 
PROPOSITION  8. 
a)  If  the  zt are  i.i.d.  draws  from  a  distribution  that  has  a  strictly 
positive  density  on  a compact  support,  the  dynamic  process  de- 
fined  by (5) and  (12) has a unique  invariant distribution. 
b)  If  the  zt are i.i.d.  draws from  the  uniform  distribution  on  [-, 
a] and m 2  2a,  the invariant distribution f  is concentrated  on the 
interval  [0*  -  r -  (w12), 0*  +  or +  (w12)] and  satisfies Ef(o)  = 
0* and varf(O)  =  or2 wI6m. 
Proof. The  proof  of  part a is omitted;  the  argument  is very close 
to that for proposition  5. For part b, Appendix  D shows that there  is 
a deterministic,  finite  time  T for  which  the  cutoff  OT is  in the  inter- 
val  [0*  -  (  -  (w12), 0*  +  a  +  (w/2)],  and  that  once  this interval 
is reached,  OT+s  remains  in  the  interval  for  all subsequent  periods 
T +  s. 
Given a T satisfying  these  claims, we have 
IOT+s  -  0T+S  <  I  OT+s  -  0*  +  I  T+s  0*<  2) 
which is less than m +  (w/2) from our assumption  that m >  2ou.  Hence, 
the evolution  of  0T+s  from  T on  is determined  by the second  case in 
proposition  7. Writing c =  (2m -  w)I(2m +  w) and applying this rule 
repeatedly,  we find that 
s-1 
OT+s =  (1  -  C)  C  T+s-T-1  +  CsOT- 
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Hence, 
s-i 
E(  T+sI OT)  =  (1 -  C)  cTE(O*)  +  c'OT  --  E(O*) 
T=O 
and 
-  (1-c)  or2  2  wu2 
=  u2w 
var(OT+Ol6T) =  (1  c)2  c2T var(O*)  -  3(1+  c) 
-  12m  6m 
T=0 
Q.E.D. 
Comparing  the  steady-state  distributions  for m >  2a  with that for 
no  popularity  weighting,  we  see  that  popularity  weighting  reduces 
the long-run  variance by a factor of u/3m. 
The  welfare  consequences  of  increasing  m for  fixed  w are similar 
to those  of  decreasing  w for  fixed  m: in both  cases,  the  steady-state 
distribution  becomes  more  efficient,  whereas  the speed  at which the 
system converges  decreases.  It may be  interesting  to note,  however, 
that  in  this  simple  model  there  is one  way to  change  the  parame- 
ters to  speed  up  the  rate  of  convergence  (when  the  initial cutoff  is 
far  from  the  optimum)  without  altering  the  steady-state  variance, 
namely,  increasing  the  window  width  w while  holding  the  ratio  of 
wim fixed.'8 
VII.  Concluding  Remarks 
The  various  models  we have  presented  suggest  that even  very naive 
learning  rules can lead to quite efficient  long-run  social states, at least 
if the environment  is not too highly  nonlinear.  Moreover,  popularity 
weighting  can contribute  to this long-run  efficiency,  and  the  use  of 
popularity  weighting  passes a crude  first-cut test of consistency  with 
individual incentives.  Of course, there are many other plausible speci- 
fications  of  behavior  rules  for  social  learning,  so it is interesting  to 
speculate  about  the robustness  of our conclusions. 
We discussed one extension,  the use of trends, in Section III. There 
are a number  of  other  extensions  that  we  have  not  considered  but 
that  seem  important.  Players  might  use  rules  of  thumb  that  make 
some use of historical data. Also,  players might be arranged  in more 
complex  networks  than  the  simple  linear  structure  we have consid- 
ered.  In addition,  our results suppose  that rules of thumb are exoge- 
nous.  It  would  be  interesting  to  complement  these  results  with  an 
18 However,  as w increases,  the specification  bias grows.  When  w is large,  it may be 
more natural to suppose  that players weight the experience  of those nearby more than 
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analysis of  a dynamic  process  by which  players adjust their  rules of 
thumb along  with their choice  of technology. 
Finally, we should  point out that popularity weighting  is not always 
as beneficial  as our  results  might  suggest.  Consider  the  problem  of 
children  in a poor neighborhood  choosing  whether  to pursue  higher 
education.  If students  who have done  so in the past tend to move out 
of the neighborhood  and past residents  are underrepresented  in the 
observation  window,  then  the choice  of higher  education  will appear 
less popular  than  it really is, and  decisions  based on  popularity  may 
be biased against this choice.'9 
Appendix  A 
Optimal  Popularity  Weighting  with  Other  Distributions 
To  better  understand  the  forces  generating  part a of  proposition  2-that  a 
single  choice  of  popularity  weight  yields  the  optimal  long-run  distribution 
uniformly  over all values  of  0-we  show that analogous  results obtain when 
the per period  noise  term  Et has distribution  F with unbounded  support. 
Suppose  first that a  =  1, so that the entire population  adjusts every period, 
and  hence  the  state x, takes  on  only  the  values  zero  and  one.  If  we  let  s, 
denote  the  vector  [prob(x,)  =  0,  prob(x,)  =  1], we have  st+1 =  sEA, where 
the transition  matrix is 
A=  [F(m  -0)  1-F(m-0)  1 
(-m  -0)  1-  F(-m  -0) 
Since this matrix is strictly positive, the system is ergodic; the unique invariant 
distribution  V* is given  by 
P*  =  0)F(-m 
- 0)  =  0) =F(-m  -  0) +  1 -  F(m -  0) 
If  F  is  the  standard  normal  distribution,  then  as  m  increases,  the  ratio 
F(-m  -  0)/[1  -  F(m  -  0)] converges  to  zero  if  0 >  0  and  converges  to 
infinity  if  0 <  0.  Hence  for  large  m, the  ergodic  distribution  of  the  system 
places probability near one  on the correct choice.  Moreover,  the same is true 
for any distribution  for which the ratio F( -  m -  0)/[ 1 -  F(m -  0)] converges 
to zero if 0 >  0 and to infinity if 0 <  0. (This  is what is meant by saying that 
the tails of the distribution  are "infinitely revealing.") 
With a more  involved  argument,  we have shown that the same conclusion 
holds  for  any  ax E  (0,  1) when  players  use  the  (discontinuous)  popularity 
weighting  "if xt  2  1/2,  choose  g  iff  ug  -  u  -m;  if x, <  i/2, choose  g  iff 
u9 -  uf 2  m." The  details are available on request; the intuition  for the result 
follows. 
Note  first that when  m  =  oo the  system is deterministic  with stable steady 
states at zero  and  one.  If  m is finite  but  very  large  compared  to  a  and  to 
the standard  deviation  of  the  distribution,  then  steps the  "wrong way" (i.e., 
decreasing  steps when xt >  1/2)  are rare "innovations," and when the distribu- 
19  We thank Roland  Benabou  for this observation. SOCIAL  LEARNING  639 
TABLE Al 
prob[x,  --  1 1  0  =  .2a,  xo =  .2r] 
Distribution  a  =  .2  a  =  .1  a  =  .05 
Normal  .53  .77  .95 
Laplace  .55  .79  .94 
Logistic  .53  .78  .96 
Standard  error  .0005  .0004  .0002 
tion  is symmetric,  transits  from  zero  to one-half  and  from  one  to one-half 
both take the same number  of innovations.  If the tails of the distribution  are 
infinitely  revealing,  then  as m ->  innovations  toward the better technology 
become  infinitely  more  likely than innovations  toward the inferior  one.  The 
analysis of Freidlin and Wentzell  (1984)  suggests  that the limit of the ergodic 
distributions  will be concentrated  on the better technology.  To  establish this 
formally,  we  partition  the  interval  into  a  large  number  of  (appropriately 
chosen)  small subintervals and approximate  the original system by two finite- 
state Markov processes,  whose  ergodic  distributions  will serve as bounds  on 
the ergodic  distribution  of the original system. We then use the discrete-time, 
finite-state  translation  of  Freidlin  and  Wentzell's  results  (Kandori,  Mailath, 
and Rob 1993; Young  1993) to confirm  the intuition  above; that is, the limits 
of  the  ergodic  distributions  of  the  finite-state  process  are concentrated  on 
the subinterval corresponding  to the better choice. 
The  discussion  above  suggests  that infinitely  revealing  tails are  sufficient 
for there  to be a single  popularity  rule  that is approximately  optimal  for all 
0. Moreover,  this rule has the nice feature  that it need  not be tailored to the 
exact form of the distribution.  Even when the tails are not infinitely revealing, 
however,  there  is another  popularity  rule  that  seems  to perform  very well, 
namely 
choose g iff ug -  u  2>  F-  1  (I  -  xt).  (A1) 
With this rule, 
E(xt+i xt)  =  (1  -  ot)xt +  oxprob[0 +  Et?F'(1  -  xt)] 
=  Xt +  ot[1  -  F(-0  +  F-(1  -  xt))  -xt], 
so that E (xt+  1  |  xt) >  xt if and only if 0 >  0; the system drifts toward the correct 
choice.  Although  the  system  may  converge  to  the  wrong  technology  with 
positive  probability,  simulations  for  the  logistic  and  Laplace  distributions 
(which both have nonrevealing  tails) suggest  that when  at is small the system 
is very likely  to converge  to  the  right  choice.  Table  Al  displays  one  set of 
simulations,  for  the  case  0  =  .2or, xO =  .2or. The  table  suggests  that  the 
behavior  for all three  distributions  is similar, even  though  the  latter two do 
not  have  infinitely  revealing  tails.  Intuitively,  when  at  is  small,  the  system 
evolves  through  a series  of  small steps  that allow the  drift  to outweigh  the 
random  forces.  We conjecture  that there  may be a general  result along these 
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Appendix  B 
Proof  of  Part c of  Proposition  2 
If  or -  m >  101, then  neither  zero  nor  one  is an absorbing  state. Our  first 
step is to show that there is a unique  invariant distribution.  To do so, we first 
note  that  the  stochastic  system  (4) is a random  contraction  in  the  sense  of 
Norman  (1972).20  A random  contraction  is a stochastic system in which  the 
realization of an i.i.d. auxiliary variable (call it w) is used  to determine  which 
of  a family  of  mappings  up  E  V is used  to  send  xt to xtl,  and  each  up. is a 
contraction  "on average."  In our context,  X  corresponds  to the realized  dif- 
ference  in payoffs,  and  there  are only  two  maps (p.: cp+(xt) =  (1  -  a)xt  + 
a and up (xt) =  (1 -  a)xt, both of which are contractions,  so that (4) is indeed 
a random  contraction.  Norman's  results  then  imply that the  Markov opera- 
tor  associated  with  system  (4)  is  quasi-compact.  We  next  note  that  when 
101  <  or -  m, the  system  (4) satisfies the  uniqueness  criterion  2.11  of  Futia 
(1982):  for  any  neighborhood  U of  the  point  x  =  l/2 and  any  point  x'  in 
[0,  1], there  is an n such that the  probability that the  system starting at x' is 
in  U exactly  n  periods  later  is  strictly  positive.  (If  m ?  or, the  uniqueness 
condition  fails since both x  =  0 and x  =  1 are absorbing.) 
The last step is to compute  the mean and variance of the invariant distribu- 
tion  V. Using E,,(xt)  =  EF,(xt+  1), we have 
E , (x) =  ( 1 -  a)E  , (x) +  a I p(x) d?,(x), 
where p(x)  =  [((u -  m +  0)/2or] +  (m/ur)xt  is the  probability that 0  +  Et  2 
m(1 -  2xt), which is the probability that xt+1 =  (1  -  a)xt  +  a. Simple algebra 
then  shows that E  =  1/2 +  [0/2(ur -  m)]. 
To  compute  the variance,  we first write the identity 
EIL(x2)  =  f{[1  -  p(x)][(1  -  a)x]2  +  p(x)[(1  -  a)x  +  a]2}dV,(x) 
=  E  (x2)  [(1  -  a)2  +  2t(I  ])m 
E  [2a(1  -  a)(u  -  m +  0)  a2mi  +  a2(r  -  M  +  0).  +  Exi  2u  2u~ 
solving for E,,(x2) and computing  var(x)  =  E,(x2)  -  [E  ,,(x)]2 give the desired 
result. Q.E.D. 
Appendix  C 
Proof  of  Proposition  5 
To  begin  we rewrite  (10) in the  following  equivalent  form: 
=min[0t  +  w, 2(0*  +  zt)  -  Ot]  if 0*  +  zt 2  0t,  (10') 
{ max[Ot  -  w,2(0*  + zt)  -  Ot]  if 0* +  zt<  t- 
To  show  that the  system  (10)  is a "random  dynamical  system" as described 
by Futia (1982),  we note  that the auxiliary events  are the zt. The  probability 
20 See Futia's (1982)  survey for a summary of Norman's results and other techniques 
for establishing  that the  invariant  distribution  is unique. SOCIAL  LEARNING  641 
distribution  Q on  the  z's does  not  depend  on  the  current  state,  and  so  in 
particular it is continuous  in the state, and the map (p(0, z) defined  by Ot+l  = 
P(0t,  Z) is easily seen  to be continuous  in 0 for fixed  z, so that (10) is indeed 
a random  dynamical  system. 
Next  we check  that it is a random  contraction,  as in Futia's definition  6.2. 
Because  the map Q is constant  in 0, the constant M in part a of the definition 
can be taken  to equal  zero.  Next  we must  show that for all z and all 0 $  0', 
d(p(0, z),  p(0', z)) 5  d(0, 0'), and for all 0 and 0', there is a positive probability 
of z such that d(p(0,  z),  p(0', z)) <  d(0, 0'). 
To  show that d(p(0,  z),  p(O',  z)) 5  d(0, 0'), we note that for all 0 and 0' and 
all z, either  (a) both  0 and  0'  move  in  the  same  direction  (e.g.,  [wp(O,  z)  - 
0][ p(O',  z) -  0'] >  0) or (b) p(0, z)  -  0 ?  0  -  p(0', z) -  0'. Case a has three 
subcases: (1) up  moves  both  locations  by w, so that d(p(0,  z),  p(O', z))  =  d(0, 
0'); or (2) the location closer to 0* +  z moves less than w, and the state farther 
away moves w, so that d(p(0, z),  p(0', z)) <  d(0, 0'); or (3) both locations move 
by less than  w, in which  case the  two locations  are reflected  about  the  point 
0*  +  z, and d(p(0,  z),  p(O', z))  =  d(0, 0'). 
In case b, suppose  without loss of generality  that 0 <  0'; then case b implies 
that 0 5  0*  +  z 5  0', and  so d(0, 0')  =  d(0, 0*  +  z)  +  d(O* +  z, 0'). With 
the triangle  inequality,  this implies  that 
d(p(0, z), p(0', z)) -  d(0, 0') 5  d(q(0, z), 0* +  z) +  d(O* +  z, p(0', z)) 
-  d(0, 0* +  z) -  d(O* + z, 0')  (C1) 
=  [d(p(0, z), 0* +  z) -  d(0, 0* +  z)] 
+  [d(O* +  z, (p(0, z)) -  d(O* +  z, 0')], 
and inspection  of (10') shows that each of the terms in brackets is nonpositive. 
Thus  d(p(0,  z),  p(O', z)) 5  d(0, 0') for all z, 0, and  0'. 
To  show that for  all 0 and  0' there  is a positive  probability that d(p(0,  z), 
P(O',  z)) <  d(0, 0'), let 0 <  0', and  suppose  first that 0  -  0* >  -u  +  (w/2). 
Then  for sufficiently  small E >  0, there  is a positive  probability that z lies in 
any sufficiently  small neighborhood  of  0  -  0*  +  e  -  (w12), and  for  z's in 
this neighborhood,  0 moves  less than  w to  the  left  and  0' moves  w, so that 
d(p(0,  z),  p(0', z)) <  d(0,  0').  If  0  -  0*  5  -r  +  (w/2) but 0'  -  0* <  (r - 
(w/2), a similar argument  establishes  the existence  of a range of z's such that 
both  0 and  0' move  to the  right,  with 0' moving  less than  0. Finally, if 0  - 
0* 5  -c  +  (w/2) and 0'  -  0*  a  c  -  (w/2), then 0'  -  0 >  w, and d(p(0, z), 
w(O', z)) <  d(0,  0')  for  z's in  a neighborhood  of  0  +  (w/2).  Thus  (10')  is a 
random  contraction. 
The  last step in the proof  is to verify that (10')  satisfies Futia's uniqueness 
condition  2.11,  which  requires  that  there  be  a  point  00 such  that,  for  any 
neighborhood  U of  00 and  any  0, there  is an  n such  that when  the  system 
begins  at 0, it has a positive  probability  of  being  in  U in period  n. It is easy 
to see that, for example,  00 =  0* satisfies this condition.  Q.E.D. 
Appendix  D 
Proof  of  Part b of  Proposition  8 
To  complete  the proof,  we must show that there exists a deterministic,  finite 
time T such that (i) I  OT  -  0* I <  CF +  (w/2) and  (ii) I'T+s -*I  <  a  +  (w/2) 
for all subsequent  dates  T  +  s. Define  dt =  I  Ot -  0* 1.  Note  that since (0 *  - 642  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
Ot) and  (Ot+  1 -  Ot) have the same sign and  IO 
-  0I |  or,  (0*  -  't) and  (t+ 
-  Ot) have the  same sign whenever  dt >  uf +  (w/2).  Hence, 
dt=  Idt -  (I|t+  -  Ot  )  (D1) 
whenever  dt >  of +  (w/2). 
As a first step toward proving  claim i, we show that for any initial condition 
there  exists  a finite  T' such  that, regardless  of  the  sample  path,  either  dT'  < 
r +  (w/2) or dT'  | OT'+1  -  .T 1 To  see this, note that (DI)  implies that until 
such a T' is reached,  dt -  dt+1 =  t-  1, and  from  proposition  7, 
t-  0tI  =  minkw  (2mw  +  )(Ot -  O*)} -: mintwX  (wm2+  w)  (2)} 
Thus,  until  the  conditions  defining  T'  are  satisfied,  the  decrease  in  dt is 
bounded  below by a positive constant  that is independent  of the sample path. 
If  dT' 
- 
o  +  (w/2),  setting  T  =  T'  completes  the  proof  of  claim i. The 
remaining  case is cr +  (w/2)  <  dT'  |IT'+1  -  OTI. In this case, (Dl)  implies 
that dT'+  1  =  I  OT'+  1 -  OT|  -  dt, which is less than w  -  [C  +  (w/2)]  =  (w/2) 
-  or <  (w/2)  +  a.  Hence  we can set T  =  T'  +  1 to complete  the  proof  of 
claim i. 
To  prove  claim ii, note  that when  I  T-  0*  1 < or +  (w12), we have I  O- 
O I '  [or +  (w/2)]  +  or, which  is less than  m +  (w/2)  from  the  assumption 
that m >  2or. From proposition  7 we then  have 
OT+1  OT \+  2m  +  w-  (T  OT 
and  since  both  0T and  'T  lie  in  the  interval  [O* -  or -  (w/2),  0*  +  or + 
(w/2)], so does  OT+ 1. The  claim now follows  from  induction  on s. Q.E.D. 
Appendix  E 
This  appendix  gives  a rough  approximation  of  how  many  periods  a player 
using  the  entire  history  of  observations  would  need  to  identify  the  better 
technology  with  a confidence  level  of  85  percent.  Suppose  that  Et  =  Elt  - 
E2t  is uniform  on  [-a,  a],  so that var(ug  -  uf)  =  r2/3.  Then  the  player at 
location  0 will  need  about  u2/302  observations  of  the  payoff  difference  to 
have an 85 percent  confidence  level.  (Recall that we have assumed  that only 
observations  of  the  payoff  difference  are used  since the levels are subject to 
a common  shock.) 
Now  the  player  at location  0 will not  observe  both  technologies  in  every 
period;  he  observes  both  at t only  if  Ot E  [0  -  w, 0  +  w]. We approximate 
the distribution  of Ot  by an N(O, aw/2)  random  variable and approximate  the 
probability of  the  event  Ot E  [0  -  w, 0  +  w] by 2w times the density  of this 
variable at 0.The  expected  wait for or2/302 observations  of both technologies 
simultaneously  is then  approximately 
k302, /2w,/(  2  )  exp  ) 
This  expression  is  minimized  at  0  =  (urw)1"2,  where  its  value  is  (e1T112/6) 
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